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As If Exposure to Toxins Were Not
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Agwingbodyofevidence Wncatesthattedccamination,bothindoo andoutdoor, avy ffectssockoutura
sstemsandthatthisinturnaffectsthesocial andpiycholgisca responsetotheaUsingNecondrycaestui
andprimarysurvey,interviewandobservationdabfromthreetxccont sitations, thispaperconeptlizes
andsummarim thefindhigstodate. V arguethatusingasocioculturalperspectivehelpsustounderstdmuchofthe
seemingy blebaviorthatacompaniescasesoftonic o . Usingeamplesfromprhnayandsecon-
darycasestudies, fourareasinwhichthesociocuturalsystemaffectedbyticontamiati c inluenetheoutcome
oftheresponsearedescribed: a) optionsmay befrustralte by i al systen; b)communations may
be frr byc)culuralimaes andsocalstrucr pattr ofspweusgecanaffectresponse;
andd)socioculturlsysemscanaffectmedcaloutcomes. Giventhenature of t stemsandhumanbehvior,
measuringtherelationshipbetweencontaition, socialresponse,andindividualbehaviorisdifficult. Anexampleof
oneapproachusingtheconceptofalienation i discussed, whereinlinkageshavebeenfound betweentoxcconamina-
tion,alienation,andpsychoogkalcopingdifficulties. Imptions forpeionalsresponding totoicconmination
casesarealsodiscussed. Weconcludethatasocioculturalperspectiveprovidesanecessarycomplementtomedkal and
eng eringperspectives ifwearetofuly understand humanreactionsto c tcoa and movetowardafevting
human health problems associatedwiththeserisks.
Introduction
The effects ofindoor air quality have received considerable
studyandattention fromscientists in recent years. This paperis
somewhatdifferentfromtheotherspresented atthisconference
because of the areas of expertise of the authors. We are not
physical scientists, nor are wephysicians. We aresociologists,
that rather different cross-breed of intellectual that combines
some ofthe traits ofhard scientists with others ofhumanists.
Some say this interesting intellectual history hasgiven usquite
superiorperipheralvision,allowing ustomakesensiblepictures
ofsightsthatappearblurredtoothers. Ontheotherhand, some
would see, as veryappropriate, the storywhichhas asociologist
overhearinghishousekeeper answering thetelephoneand say-
ing tothecaller, "Yes, thisiswherethedoctorlives, buthe's not
the kind ofdoctor thatdoes anybody any good."
Wehopewedopeoplesomegood. Morespecifically, wehope
thatourpaperinthisvolume canaddanimportantdimensionto
thestudyoftechnologicalhazards, suchasindoorairpollution.
Thatdimensionhastodowiththeiimportanceofthesociocultural
perspective in affecting the impact oftoxic contamination on
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humans and in shaping the efforts we make to cope with this
contamination.
In recentyears, wehave witnessed aproliferation oftechno-
logical hazards and disasters that have had major impacts on
humanpopulations. Ranging from toxicchemicalconumination
toradiationleakages toundergroundminefires, manyofthese
hazardsanddisastershaveincludedissuesofindoorairquality
(1-4). Andmanyhaveresultedinseriousproblemsforengineer-
ing and medical officials who have attempted to alleviate the
technical and health problems that have accompanied these
hazards and disasters. From the pointofview ofthese profes-
sionals, theirjobhasoftenbeenhamperedbywhatappeartobe
veryoddbehavioralpatternsofmany intheaffectedpopulation.
Inacommunityplaguedbyanundergroundcoalminefire, a
federalminingengineerspeaksatapublicmeetingtoinforn the
residentsoftheprogressofaboreholestudydesignedtodiscover
thescopeofthefiresothatrationalremedialactioncanbetaken.
Theengineerisshouteddownbyhostileresidentsdemandingto
know whatthegovernment willdotoprotecttheirhealth right
now, aquestionhewasnotipepredtofieldnortainedtoanswer
(Kroll-Smith, unpublisheddata). Hebelievedhe wastrying to
helpthecommunityby sharinginformationinanopenmanner
withthem. Residentsperceivehimastheenemy.
InMemphis,rumorswereinitiatedthataresidentialareawas
builtonwhathadoncebeenatoxicwastedump. Neighborhood
residentsvisitedtheirphysicians,complainingofvariousmaladies
thattheyattributedtothisdumpundertheirhouses. Eventually,
itwasdiscoveredthatthedump neverexisted (5).KROLL-SMITH AND COUCH
In response to concerns over the health effects ofchemicals
leaking fromatoxic wastedumpatthe Love Canal, New York
State'sHealthCommissionerannouncesaplanthathebelieves
will remedytheproblemandprotectthehealthoftheresidents
ofthearea. Hebelievesheisactinginaresponsible,professional
manner. Afterannouncingtheplan, ayoungwomanfromtheau-
dience shouts, "You'remurdering us!" (2).
Behaviors suchasthese arevery frustrating to scientists and
engineersconcerned withunderstandingandalleviatingtechno-
logical hazards and their results. These behaviors seem inex-
plicable, irrational, andcounterproductive. Indeed, theyarefar
from what we would expect, given what we know ofbehavior
following natural disasters.
Social and Psychological Response
Natural disasters in developed countries are frequently ex-
periencedasemotionalshocks, butonlyrarelydotheyresultin
long-term psychosocial impairment (6-8). The trauma of
technological hazardsthatdisrupttherelationshipbetweenpeo-
ple and the biosphere, however, frequently last for years, im-
pedingthepsychosocialdevelopmentofvictims(9-11). Chronic
psychosocial impairment does not fit the common core ofex-
pectedpost-hazardresponsesandmustgiveuspausetoconsider
theuniqueproblemsposedbywillfulornegligentconumination
oftheenvironment. KaspersonandPijawka(12)observethatthe
"majorburdenofhazardmanagementindevelopedsocietieshas
shiftedfromrisksassociatedwithnaturlprocessestothosearis-
ing fromtechnological developmentandapplication."
Why do technological disasters diminish the long-term psy-
chosocial health of victims to a greater extent than natural
disasters? Perhaps it is because toxic spills, asbestos decay, or
coremeltdowns "contmin atera than merelydamage... .they
pollute, befoul, taint, ratherthanjustcreatewreckageandthey
scare human beings in new and special ways. . ." (13). The
primordial antipathy tothethoughtofbeingpoisonedrequires
littlecommentary. Surely,hereistheessentialreasonforthepro-
longedimpactofenvironmentalcontmination. Indeed, ifmore
complex forms of human development are contingent on
gratificationoftheneedforphysicalsafety(14), theperception
ofone's house, backyard, or neighborhood park as poisoned
wouldinterferewithsuchgrowth. Butwewillcomplicatethepic-
tureconsiderablyifweaskanadditionalquestion: Wheredoes
theperception ofcontvmination comefrom?
Therearetwoquitedifferentanswerstothisquestion. Ifpeople
behaveasengineers,assomehaveargued(15),thenthywillseek
allthefactsanddeducefromthemthedegreeofthreatposedbythe
contaminant.Theimageisofanobjectiveworldtobeknownand
arationalknowersortingandassessingthefacts.Assumedhere,
however,isthatallthefactsareknownandarecommunicatedin
amannerthatmakethemknowabletothenonscientist; alsoas-
sumedisthatpeopleactasisolatedindividualsandthatbehavior
naturallyfollowstherationalaccumulationoffacts.Amajorcriti-
cismoftherationalactoranswer,however,isthatthescientificfor-
mulationofrealitydoesnotexhaustthepossiblerangeofhuman
actions, mostofwhicharebasedonnontheoreticalorcommon-
senseassumptionsabouttheworld(16).Indeed,thepost-modern
viewofscienceitselfnowassumesthesubjectivebiasesofscien-
tists as critical inunderstaning how "rational" inquiry is ac-
complished (17).
Ifordinary people do not engage solely in logico-deductive
reasoningtomakesenseoutoftheirworld, whatelsedotheydo?
Another answer suggests that they construct reality in concert
withothers. "Humansexperiencetheirenvironment," Douglas
(18) writes, "mediated by conceptual categories fabricated in
socialinteraction." Assumedhereisthat"safe" and"hazardous"
aresociallyconstructedcategoriesofmeaning. Thesensepeo-
plemakeoutoftheirworld, inotherwords, is shapedmoreby
theactivities ofothers thanby "objective facts."
Between events and behavior formed in response to those
events, there is a social process ofdefinition (19). Persons ex-
periencing a flood or hurricane are notjust responding to the
physical events themselves, butto whatthose eventsmeanand
represent to them as socially constructed crises. Between the
physicalenvironmentandhumanresponseisasocialprocessthat
constructs the meaning of a situation or event as dangerous,
hazardous, challenging, orbenign. A socialconstructionistview
of the perception of risks and threats suggests that although
psychosocialdistressisexperiencedbyconcreteindividuals, it
arises fromand isresolvedorintensifiedinasocial context. A
comprehensiveinterpretationofdisastertrauma, inotherwords,
willincludeanaccountofthesocioculturalprocessesthatshape
theexperienceofdistress. We "aredisturbed," wroteEpictetus,
"notby things, butby theviews which [we] takeofthings."
Tothisviewofthepersonasappraisingandfashioningaworld
inconcertwithothers, wemodifythetraditionaldisaster stage
model to fit the case ofbiospheric contamination and add the
complementarynotionthatitismorethananobjectivesequence
ofevent-boundedsteps; itisalsoamoralvocabularyencourag-
ing, discouraging, andjustifying responses totheevent.
Whennatunaldisastersarethecauseofextremeenvironments,
the unstructuring ofroutines and common coping modes can
beginwiththewarning stage, theapprehensionthatacalamity
mayoccur(20). Bythethreatstage, whenthereareunequivocal
signsoftheapproachingdisasterforce, theextremesituationis
underway. Duringimpact, amaelstromofflyingdebrisorrag-
ing floodsortoweringwallsoffireripapartthe lastvestigesof
"businessasusual" inthefull forceofnature'swrath. The im-
pactstageistemporally significantbecauseitmarksthemostin-
tense point in the disaster sequence, after which there may be
considerablepainandgrief, butthedestruction isover.
Duringtheinventoryandrescuestagesimmediatelyfollowing
impact, survivorsbegintoassesstheirlossesandgradually piece
togetherapictureofwhathashappened. Survivorgroupsspon-
tneouslyemerge-small altruisticcommunitieswhosegoalsin-
cludetreatingthewounded,extinguishingfires, andfreeing ap-
ped victims. With the onset ofthe remedy stage, the extreme
situationbeginstosubsideasoutsidereliefagenciestakecontrol
ofthedisastersceneandimposeaformal structure(notalways
withtheapproval ofthesurvivors) ontheinventory andrescue
stages. Duringtherecovery stagetheextremeenvironmenthas
beenreplacedwitheitherthereconstitutionoftheoldstructure
ortheimplementationofamodifiedpatternofpersonalandcol-
lectivelife.
Notethatinthisstagemodel, thetimelapsebetweenthewar-
ning,threat,impact,andinventoryandrescuestagescanbevery
brief, insomecases, onlyseveralminutes. Thestagemostlike-
ly tobeextended intime is the warning stage. Theeruptionof
Washington State's Mount St. Helen's volcano in 1980, for
example, hadbeenanticipatedforseveralweeks. Thetimelapse
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betweenthethreat stageandinventory-rescue, however, wasless
than an hour. The extreme environment created by natural
disasters is typically short lived, ahorrendous moment intime
bounded by two periods ofstability-one historical, the other
emergent. At that point, the disaster enters the collective
memory, recalledonly onthoseoccasions deemedappropriate
for remembering a shared experience ofhorror.
Chronic Technological Disaster
The type of extreme environment created by a long-term,
humanly caused disaster (termed a "chronic technological
disaster," orCTD) isconsiderablydifferentfromthatdescribed
above. The Centralia study and the work on Love Canal (1,2)
speakofaprotracted, seemingly endless periodoftimebetween
the discovery of the aversive agent and the realization that its
worstconsequenceshavepast. Thereis nobriefmomentofter-
ror followed by an easily defined sequenceofinventory, rescue,
remedy, and recovery. Indeed, for many Centralians and
residents ofLove Canal, relieffrom fear came only when they
werepermanently removed from theirhomes andtowns, apro-
cess that took several years.
CTDs tendtotrapaportionofapopulation inthewarning and
threatstages, freezing theminextendedperiodsofapprehension
and dread. A mine fire that moves slowly through accessible
veinsoftoxicchemicalsthatleach invisiblythroughunderground
swales may at times give signals that danger is near, but the
signalsarefrequently vague andopentodispute. Long-term ex-
posure to warning and threat, particularly when it is unevenly
distributed throughout thepopulation, places severedemands on
the coping resources ofa population.
Occasionally, individuals or faimilies experiencethe impactof
the agents in the form of subsidence, a chronic cough, or
lassitude. But sincetheexperience rarely extendsbeyondtheper-
sonorthefamily, itisnotlikely tobecometheoccasionforcom-
munal action. Indeed, the source ofthe impact-the reason a
family is always tired or a person is having upper respiratory
trouble-isitselffiequentlyvaguetothepointofinvitingmultiple
interpretations. In otherwords, the impact ofthe CTD, to bor-
row a distinction from C. W. Mills, is more likely to remain a
"trouble," a personal problem, than to become an "issue," a
socially recognizedoccasion for communal response (21).
Trapped inthe firsttwo stages ofthedisaster cycle, apopula-
tion is prevented fromprogressing to thepoint ofreassembling
adistribution ofitselfintocomplementary understandings and
tasks. Any attempt at what we might call efforts at remedy and
recoveryarenothumanistic efforts directed towardtheaffected
populationbuttechnical activities aimedatdisposingoftheaver-
sive agent. More likely than not, as we witnessed at Times
Beach, Centralia, and Love Canal, remedial and recovery
technology, however confounded by political gameplaying, will
beunable to stoptheadvanceofthedisaster agent. Residents are
rescued onlybyrelocation, which does notallow thesettlement
to reestablish itself. The webofsocial positions wovenby com-
mon understandings is ripped apart before there is an end to
severe social and ecological disruption. The morethe stages of
warning and threat become institutionalized, that is, the more
these normally temporary stages take on the character ofper-
manence, thegreaterwillbethetollonaffectedpopulations. A
CTD does not create a moment between points of stability;
rather, it imposes a fixed, seemingly permanent period ofin-
stability, atimewithinwhichconventionalpatternsofbehavior
nolongerseemtowork. Extendedperiodsofambiguouswarn-
ingandthreatdestabilizethetraditionalpatternofsocial relation-
ships and call into question the commonly held beliefs upon
which social life is based. Objective reality can no longer be
agreed upon, as some claim to be in grave danger, and others
claim the situation is not that serious. These different claims
about danger can have a negative impact on the ability of in-
dividuals todeal with the situation athand.
Interpreting the deleterious effects of these claims about
danger ontheindividual begins withtheideathatintoxic con-
tamination cases "subjective evaluations areclosely tiedtothe
developmentofphysical andmentalhealthproblems" (10). Sub-
jectivity is related to uncertainty. People facing the threat of
chemicalcontamination orasbestospoisoning liveinachronic
stageofcontingentloss. Thegreaterthedegreeofcontingency
oruncertainty, thegreatertheneedtoconstructsymbolicclaims
ofthe scopeand seriousness ofthethreat. "In situations...in-
volvingexposuretoinvisiblecontaminants... .onefindsthatin-
visiblehealththreatsaremetbythedevelopmentofnonempirical
beliefsystems aboutthenatureofthethreats" (22,23). Several
studies suggestthatthese symbolic claims "maybemoreimpor-
tantindeterminingchronic stressandmentalhealtheffectsthan
is the actual threat or danger posed" (1,9,22,24). Thus a key
questioninthestudyofthesocialsourcesoftraumaconcernsthe
meaning ofbeliefs invictims' emotional andbehavioral response
to threat or loss.
Beliefs-Certainty and Reality
In earlier articles we called nonempirical or symbolic con-
structions ofdanger "threat beliefsystems" and distinguished
themfromriskperceptions (23,25). Moststudiesofriskrelyon
theconcept "perception" toconvey the linkbetween the hazard
and the person's appraisal ofdanger. While we have learned a
greatdeal aboutthe individual'spotential responsetorisksitua-
tionsthroughthe study ofperception, theegoorientationofthe
concepthas tendedtonarrowinterpretations tothepsychological
makeupoftheperceiver. Beliefs, we suggest, moreprofoundly
influencethebelieverthanperceptions influencetheperceiver.
Toperceive istobecomeawareofsomethingdirectlythroughthe
senses; to believe, ontheotherhand, istocommitwithconvic-
tion to a publicly ratified view of some aspect of the world.
Beliefs are internalized, they are located deeper in the psyche
than perceptions and are farless easily modified.
Thetenacity ofbeliefs isexplained inpartbythefactthatthey
are social phenomena. While perceptions issue from sensory
stimuli, beliefs are constructed in conversation among people
who agree that the world or a portion of it is sacred, safe,
dangerous, worthy of trust or distrust, and so on (26,27) [the
classic statementonthe sociology ofbeliefremains Durkheim's
(28)]. Collective agreement strengthens theholdbeliefs haveon
believers. Perceptions aremoreprivatematters, easierto revise;
to violate a belief, however, is to risk censure anddisapproval.
Thus, embeddedinbeliefs isamoralclaimonbelievers. Theyare
required toemoteandbehave in ways consistent withthe social
reality symbolized by the beliefs.
CTDs resultintheestrangementofvictims fromtheirnormal
community support networks. The more the claims of con-
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tamination arebelieved inby members ofthe supportnetwork,
the more likely they are to avoid and withdraw from claims
makers. Victims tend to respond to this avoidance by forming
groupsoftheirown. The coremembersofthese newsupport net-
works areusually otherpeoplewhoclaimtobepoisonedorfear
the threatofcontamination. Togethertheyfrequently affirm one
another's fears, developing a set of cognitive and emotive
assumptions about danger that place them farther outside the
boundaries ofordinary community life. The first and most im-
portant grassroots group to emerge at LoveCanal wasorganized
on the basis of a sharedbeliefsystem regarding the amount and
kindofdanger the area wasfacingandwhatitsmembers were en-
titled to as tax-paying citizens (2). Similarly, Love Canal
residents talked about chemical migration and risk using "the
conditional language ofbelief ..." (24). ResidentsofCentralia,
Pennsylvania, respondedto the risksofanunderground minefire
with a "shared set of linked ideas concerning the amount and
kindsofdangers facing theirfimilies" (1,23). Similarly, people
residing near the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear facility
developed coherent beliefs about safety and trust ingovernment
after the TMI accident (22). Several families in a trailer park
contaminated with asbestos "developed new linguistic/emotional
definitions ofthe situation" and "a newbasisfromwhichtoview
and respond to their environment" (29).
Beliefsconfercertainty onreality. They reduce thehazardthat
accompaniesthe acuteexperienceofuncertainty. Technical ex-
perts may disagree over the presenceofPCBs or dioxin in peo-
ple'sbackyards, butbelievers arecertainthechemicals arethere.
Certainty is also extended totheambiguous events and incidents
coincidentwithtechnological hazards. Forbelievers, the mean-
ings ofa power surge in a gas monitor, aneighbordiagmsedwith
cancer, or an agency official who cites evidence thatthe risks are
not as severe as first indicated, does not reside in the events
themselves butinthelogicofthebeliefsystem. Believers canstop
asking questions aboutthe scopeanddegree ofdanger. Certain
ofthe "true" extentofthedanger, they require little supporting
information to confirm their threat beliefs and an extraordinary
amount of contrary evidence to disconfirm them. A heavy
cigarette smoker in Centralia scoffed at the idea that his two-
pack-a-day habit might be the source of a chronic, productive
cough. "I'vebeensmokingall mylife," hereasoned, "but it's on-
lybeensincethisminefirethatI startedtocough" (Kroll-Smith,
unpublished data).
Thecertainty withwhichbelieversbelieve inthe ralityofloss
and threat appears to be independent ofthe statistical fiequen-
cy ofthe losses orthreats themselves. Interviews with Centralia
residents whoconstructed athreat-beliefsystemdiscoveredthat
not everybelievercouldrecountpersonalexperiencesto confirm
therealityofthethreatofpoisonous gases andsubsidences, and
thepersonalencounters somepeopledidhavewith thefirevaried
in number and intensity. Whilepersonal experiences were not
available to allbelievers, two sourcesofaccreditedpublic infor-
mation were: theworst case situationsofseven families who ex-
periencedpersistently high gasreadings intheirhomes, and the
threecrisis events thatoccurredinthevicinity ofthefire. These
atypical cases were frequently talked about as ifthey were the
typical experiences, as ifthe most extreme was also the most
representative. Claims of damage and loss were based on the
relatively fewcatastrophic events and clearly dangerous situa-
tions in the history of the blaze, not the long and tedious
chronologyofeventsthatmighthaveencouragedalessdreadful
apprehensionofthe situation (1).
Thereis, ofcourse, asoundecologicalbasisforthisapprehen-
sion. Extremecasesmaybestatisticallyunrepresentativeofpeo-
ple'sexperiencesatthemoment,butthereisnowayofproviding
unqualifiedassurancesthatthenextdayorthedayafterthatnew
victimswillnotbediscovered. Seeminglysimplequestionsdefy
empiricalanswers: Howmuch, ifany,ofthetoxicsubstancesare
present? Whatis adangerousdose?AmIabsorbingany? Prob-
abilitiesandprofessionalopinions arethebestanswersthescien-
tificcommunity canprovide. Beliefs, however, aredefinitive.
Adding tothedifficultiesisthefactthatnoteveryonesharesin
thesedefinitivebeliefs. Intoxiccontaminationincidentsnoone
interpretationoftheamountandscopeofdangercanmonopolize
thepublicimagtion. Thesourcesofthispluralityofinterpreta-
tionsoriginatein thegeographicparticularismofthelargelyin-
visiblecontminationplume. Moststudiesofair, water, andsoil
contamination report the uneven, erratic course of the con-
taminants (2,30,31). Noteveryone is immediately affected. In
this type ofcrisis divergent sectors and subsystems of a com-
munity canbeexpected tobeexperiencingdifferentlevelsofen-
vironmental disruption and stress. Underground swales, wind
currents, streams, andpastengineeringpracticesareamongthe
variables that result in the absence ofa uniformdispersion of
pollutants. "Well, in our area there was none (chemicals),"
remembers aLoveCanalresident, "Wenevereventhoughtofit.
It'sprobably atthesouthendbutwe'reatthenorthend. . ." (24).
"Iwasbornand raisedinGlobe(Arizona), "observesoneman;
"I'vehadsulfursmokeononesideandtheasbestosmill onthe
other, andI'mashealthyasanewhorse"(29). Considerthecase
oftheCentraliaminefire(1): "Burningeyes, thetasteofsulfur,
and an acrid odor accompanied by headaches, lassitude, and
respiratorytroubles wereunequivocalevidenceforresidentson
the 'hotside,'.. . thatthegasescausedbythefirewerecirculating
intheborough. Forresidents onthenorth sideoftown,however,
gas was not 'intheair'."
For some residents the ihreat ofcontamination is remote or
simplynonexistent. Forothers,however, contaminationis not a
remotepossibilitybutanimmediatereality. Forbelieversitis no
longeramatterofpayingattention towarningcues, tosignalsof
danger, forthey arealready intheimpactstage. In awaterpollu-
tioncase, a womanrecallslistening to a 16-year-oldgirltellof
herfearsthatthecreek'scontaminantswouldaffectherability
to have children. "I was standing over atthedoor, crying with
her, andIthoughtthen, 'LordJesus, thiscan'tgoon!' "(32). For
other residents, however, the problem is not as immediate,
perhaps not as severe, and calls for a less volatile and drastic
response. AresidentofLoveCanalrecallsspending"alotoftime
downinthecreek(purportedlycontminated)andInevergotany
skin rash. . We'vehad somuchwildlife...schoolsoffish, rab-
bits" (24). Biosphericcontaminationcreates acrisisrequiring
achoiceastowhichofseveralcompengexperiencesofthesame
world, eachofwhichtacitly claims tohavefaithfully reflected
thatworld, willbecredited asthevalidversion.
Thus, a segmentofaneighborhood or anofficefloor is now
experiencing itsenvironment asthe sourceofdisease, adverse
generationaleffects, andhumanloss; theirhomes orwork sta-
tions are viewed as dangerous, and certain areas in their
neighborhoods or offices are redefined as lifethreatening and
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tobeavoided. Groups emerging around athreat-beliefsystem
cyclequicklytotheimpactstageandtalkaboutthepossibilityof
"suffering," "fear," and "death." Withafirmbeliefintheirstatus
asvictims ofcontamination, believersarelikelytousetheemo-
tionally charged vocabulary ofimpacttoplace moraldemands
on neighbors, friends, and others to accept their claims that
adverse effects are now occurring and immediate action is
necessary. Peoplewhodefinetheproblemasatworstawarning
or perhaps as no problem at all are likely to begin viewing
believers andtheiremergentgroupsasthreatstopropertyvalues
orjobs (1,24,33). Thosewhodo notfind intheenvironmental
cueswarrantforextremeconcernarelikelytoseethemselvesas
victims ofafictive oratbestexaggerated crises.
A challenge to a community's primitive beliefin a safe en-
vironment (perhaps best pictured as the bottom block in
Maslow's hierarchy ofneeds) tears at the seams ofa cultural
theme basic to social survival. Ifthe water, soil, or air is con-
tminated, thereislittlereasonformetocontinueinvestinginmy
community orjob. However, the evidence ofcontamination is
likelytobelessthancertain. Perhapsmyexperienceofthelocal
biosphere does not lead to the conclusion that an immediate
threatexists. Inthatcase,continuedinvestmentinmycommunity
forjobmakessenseandchallengestothatinvestmentarelikely
tobeinterpretedasthreatstomycivilrights. Bothintepretations
arelikelytoevolveintocompetingbeliefsystems, withbelievers
inoneinterpretationdislikingotherbelieversthemoreintense-
ly they are felt to threaten their view of the world (1,24).
Biosphericcontaminationmoreoftenthannotcreatessituations
wherenooneinterpretationofthecrisisisagreeduponbyallthe
parties, and competing interpretations evolve into competing
beliefsystems. Whatemergesarecompetingviewsofthesame
local world: it is dangerous and uninhabitable; you should be
concerned; no, theenvironmentissafeandhabitable; youshould
getcontrol ofyourself.
Phenomenologists refertothistypeofcognitiveconflictasa
"realitydisjuncture" andsuggestthatitcanbethesourceofcon-
siderablepsychosocial stress(34,35). Disputantsinarealitydis-
juncturelookatwhattheyperceivetobethesameworldandex-
perience itincontrary ways. Thesocialvalidationnecessary to
affirmtheindividual's trustthattheworldisasheorsheseesit
istransformed intoa sourceofsocialconflict. Thevery nature
ofclaims-making activityensuresthattheconflictisnotwaged
over whatever verifiable information is available about the
hazard. Rather, thedisputeisbetweenpeoplewhoperceivetheir
antagonistsasablebutunwillingtocooperateina"realistic" and
"justifiable" definitionofthethreat. Thus,disputantsaredefined
as persons with special motives to make false claims. Fear,
hysteria, andgreedareamongtheseverallabelsantagonistsapp-
ly to one another to explain away opposing claims (1,24,29).
Negativelabeling heightenstheemotional intensityofthecon-
flicts exacting atoll onthepsychosocial stability ofdisputants.
Toxic chemicals leaking through underground swales or
asbestosfibersfloatingthroughtheairdonotdestroybuildings
or level houses. But they do damage the moral rules for local
community orofficelife. Whenthepresenceofcontamination
isdefinedbyasegmentofaneighborhoodas"impact," thehigh
degreeofuncertaintyaccompanyingthistypeofhazardensures
thatcompetingdefinitionswillemerge,creatingamarkedcrisis
inthelocalculture. Insofaraseachofthedisputantsinthiscrisis
maintainshisorherownexperiencesastheineradicablegrounds
for further action, dispute resolution is all but impossible as
potentially endless cycles ofreciprocal blaming, censure, and
condemnation ensue.
Conclusions
We began this paper by pointing out a number ofinstances
wherevictimsoftoxiccontaminationbehaved inseemingly in-
explicable ways. We have argued that using a sociocultural
perspective inlookingattoxiccontminationsituationscanhelp
us to understand behavior in such situations. This behavior is
shapedlessbystatisticalprobabilitiesofdangerthanbythesub-
jectively lived experiences of people under objectively am-
biguous circumstances.
Inmosttoxiccontamination cases, thedegreeofdangercan-
not be known with certainty. This opens the door for the con-
struction of radically differing interpretations of reality; the
development ofthreat-belief systems; the differential cycling
throughofdisasterstages;thebreakdownofsharedbeliefsabout
andpatternsofsocial interaction; andthecreationofdestructive
socialconflict. Theresultsofthisprocessincludeahighlevelof
socialandpsychological stressontheaffected socialgroups, be
they families, communities, oroffices.
Ifwe want to ameliorate this stress, we must begin from an
understaningoftheoperationofthissociocultunalprocess. Such
an understanding includes the realization that individual and
group coping with indoor air problems may itself exacerbate
psychological stress and adverse health effects. Intervention
techniques of health professionals should not be limited to
physicalandpsychologicaldimensions, butshouldalsobecon-
cernedwithsocioculturalprocesses, beingeverawarethatcer-
taincopingprocessesmaymakethehealthsituationworserather
thanbetter.
Finally, ofcourse, contaminationvictimsarenottheonlypeo-
plewhoconstructtheirrealitysocially; wealldo, eventhoseof
us who call ourselves scientists. We must remember that the
human animal is forever hunting for vocabularies that will be
faithful descriptions ofreality, but always ends up by using a
vocabulary thatselectsfromonly aportionofthatreality. This
is as true forthe epidemiologist studying the health ofa PCB-
contaminated workplace as it is for employees trying to make
senseoftheamountandkindofdangerthechemicalspose. Each
isselectingfromthemultiplerealitiesthatconstitutethechemi-
caldanger. Andinordertoapproximateamorecompleteunder-
standing ofthatdangereach needstheother's interpretation.
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